554 It would be considered "wrong" for the members of
591 this group to present themselves at an al-Qasr wedding party,
[579] or the annual celebration held in honor of a local saint of
[585] the area. When I inquired about the conspicuous absence of
[796] some of my chief informants from such gatherings, I was told
[124] that "they will send their gifts," or that "it is not decent
[431] that they come to something such as this." In terms of
554 Bedouin social structure, there are a number of plausible
591 explanations for this "status separation." Fathers should
182 not attend public affairs at which their sons may be "per-
561 forming," i.e., young men should be allowed to play a public
[593] role outside the confines of the father-son authority structure. By virtue of the extension of the father role, and its corresponding authoritarian attitude, every member of the elder age-set commands certain rights and obligations which would prevent the free expression that is the hallmark of Bedouin parties. Conversely, and at the more general level, members of the "status group" who wish to remain members of this circle accept certain restrictions on social
[114] intercourse. At the five different Bedouin "parties" which I attended, there were "elders" present, but none of them could be classified as members of the "status group." Bedouins plainly state that elders should not attend parties, but, on the other hand, they show much more concern and emotion when they say that a member of the "status group" should not "be

554 seen" at any such function. It would appear that the mechanism
571 at work here is not simply a device to provide the younger
182 generation with a tension-release situation, but also a
561 symbolic expression of the difference between the possessors
[154] and the non-possessors of authority, a confirmation of the political order.

[598] The avoidance practice, or separation, between the old and the young in the "party" situation is a structural fact of Bedouin society, and, though it may ultimately be defined as a conflict control or legitimating mechanism, in the context of culture change new aspects and meanings attach
554 to the phenomenon. The "status group" is an agent of change
571 in al-Qasr; its members can afford to gamble in the market
178 economy of Marsa Matruh since they possess the reserve capital
[471] (in the form of sheep) and the social prestige which permits
[439] this. The "status group," with business and social relations
[177] in Marsa Matruh, enjoys both the benefits of associational ties with the Egyptians and the communal ties with their fellow Bedouins. They see themselves as being different from their fellow tribesmen, and they tend to face more towards Marsa Matruh than al-Qasr. In short, they are the "cultural brokers" who support an ideology of change, they extol the benefits of a new way of life over and against the old.

[189] One repudiation of tradition which constitutes an
[196] attempt to define the style of life of the "status group"

554 concerns magic. Each August there is a celebration in honor
571 of al-Qasr's local saint. At these celebrations, the darwish
178 performs his special skills such as putting a red-hot iron
789 to his tongue, or standing on a skin drum held high by his
• 796 two assistants. No member of the "status group" attends these affairs because the darwish and his magic "belong totally to the old way of life." This is a restriction on social intercourse. It may also be a rejection of the saint's sacred power, or reluctance on the part of the "status group" to
554 share authority. The ideology which the "status group" in
571 al-Qasr has developed embodies attitudes of cooperation and
183 patience with induced programs of change. These attitudes are invoked in varying degrees corresponding to motives of economic gain, desire for power, and altruistic concern. But the result is a "status group" mood which may be described as one of disdain for the old way of life. Ideology and discontent in al-Qasr are mainly evident among the members of the "status group."

554 The pool from which the members of the "status group"
556 are recruited consists of the "status honor" possessors of
571 three lineages (two Sa'adi and one Marabit). These have been,
* [613] traditionally and presently, the wealthiest and most influential in al-Qasr. Wealth in al-Qasr is defined in terms of three things: sheep, land, and olives. Olives are becoming the measure of wealth in the modern al-Qasr: sheep are the tradi-

156 draw al-Qasr into the Egyptian political community. He has
159 committed himself to work hand-in-hand with the Governor of
554 Marsa Matruh in introducing changes connected with economics
177 and education into al-Qasr. He does not conceal this fact.
178 When I spoke with him about helping me with my study of
124 changing attitudes in al-Qasr, he said: "I might have the
829 time to do this, but before I decide you will have to bring
[571] me a letter from the Governor stating that he wishes me to
cooperate with you." The identity and responsibility which
Hajj 'Ali feels for his role of agent of change is indicated
in his remark to me that he had heard "there were others in
the desert who feel and think the way I myself do."

156 Hajj 'Ali is discretely aware of the status difference
159 between himself, as a member of the "status group," and the
554 others of al-Qasr. As Weber would say, he perceives the
571 difference in "style of life." I was invited to Hajj 'Ali's
574 house for 'iid al-fitr, the feast marking the end of Ramadan.
796 I thought that this would be a good opportunity to observe
123 the "leaders" of al-Qasr together. I was very much surprised
to find present no members of the "status group" but only
[556] their exact opposites. On the occasion of this feast it is
[735] the custom that the rich treat the poor. As an additional
surprise, we had a very simple meal of bread, dates, peanuts,
and tea. Hajj 'Ali explained to me: "My neighbors do not
have my economic advantages, and I do not think it is proper

156 to serve other than what they eat." Hajj 'Ali is not only
159 conscious of social stratification in his society, but he also
554 has a great deal of empathy with the less endowed, a pre-
571 requisite of a traditional Bedouin leader and an advantageous
574 one for a modern leader.
796
123

He is aware of most traditional institutions and how
156 they relate to conditions of modernity. Hajj 'Ali, whose own
159 marriages speak for his political acumen, sees only disadvantages
554 in the cousin-right marriage custom of the Bedouins. His
829 interest in getting on with the business of change, so to
582 speak, has led him to question a basic right contained in the Bedouin principle of lineage structure and corporate membership.

> A thing which I do not like about our customs is the idea that a man has a right to his uncle's daughter. The man binds his cousin and in the end he might not marry her and will be the cause of her never marrying. He gives himself the authority to decide whom she may or may not marry. If he knows she desires to marry a certain man, he says: "She can marry anyone but not that one."

[562] Here he challenges the traditional right of the individual male in Bedouin society, favoring the rights of the female.

[177] The emancipation of the female, especially in rights and
[178] duties concerned with the marriage contract, is an element
[562] of the modernization process in Egyptian society and the Middle East in general.

* 613 The bait, as a political group, is in part structurally
602 defined by the corporate principle which states that blood-kin
571
682

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942) Sanusi

safe place when on seasonal moves. Often a shrine, sometimes the shrine of a very famous saint, is no more than a wall of stones, with perhaps a stick, with pieces of cloth tied to it, erected over the grave, and this is the usual form in the steppe grazing-grounds. There are generally cemeteries around the tombs.

All these shrines are visited by the Bedouin from time to time, when they are passing by or when they have some request to make of the holy man. Many of them are cult centres, an annual ceremony, one of the chief events of the Bedouin year, being held at them; and when they are near the border between tribes, or between tribal sections, this is an occasion for intertribal, or intersectional, gatherings. There is no saint whose tomb is much visited by the Bedouin who has not performed miracles, some of them very remarkable miracles, and there is probably none who has not at some time or other cured the sick or given an heir.

The tombs of these holy men, Sidi this, Sidi that, and Sidi the other, are found in profusion over the whole of inhabited Cyrenaica. The historically best known are those of Sidi Rafa', one of the Companions of the Prophet, near al-Zawiya al-Baida on the plateau, of Sidi 'Abdalla, one of the Prophet's standard-bearers, in the oasis of Aujila, and of the founder of the Sanusiya Order, Sidi Muhammad bin 'Ali al-Sanusi, at Jaghbub oasis. The shrines belong to the tribes and tribal sections in whose earth the Marabouts are buried and the Marabouts are looked upon as tribal and sub-tribal patrons. Like the Sanusiya Order, they have become part of tribal life.

I have earlier reproduced Col. De Agostini's map of the Hasa tribe to serve as an example of the territorial distribution of lineages. The same map serves to illustrate the distribution of shrines in a tribal territory. It can be seen from this map, which shows only the best-known Marabout tombs, that all the different sections of the tribe have their shrines, and I would draw attention to an interesting feature of the distribution which I have also noted in other tribal areas: how often these sacred spots are near a tribal boundary, or near the boundary between one tribal section and another. This may not be pure chance, for the Marabouts in their lifetimes were regarded as standing outside the tribal system, to which indeed, being foreigners from the west, they did not belong, and their chief political role was

between man and man, although the various cereal dishes which constitute their regular meals are said to have a similar effect.

The son who continues to eat with his father "as he always had been doing," also continues to accept his authority. Indeed he could do little else at this stage, for he lacks the economic means to cut away. Neither at marriage nor after is there any transfer of wealth from father to son. The new tent recently pitched is no more than a dormitory to which the young couple retire at night. During the daytime the son is still to be seen in his father's tent, and, in the male quarters, things appear to be much the same as before. In the female quarters, the only superficial change is the more frequent appearance among the women of one who, before marriage, often sat among them if she had been a close neighbour or a close cousin previously; or of an additional helper if she had come from afar. On the surface things remain "as they always have been," although in fact, a whole set of changes have been initiated.

Rites de passage are few among the Bedouin. A man's progress in life is ceremonially marked by only four events: his birth, circumcision, marriage and burial. His development into manhood is not marked by clearly defined stages. About the age of seven, the henna markings on the front of a boy's shirt for protection from the evil eye are not renewed, the cowrie shell stitched to the front of his cap as a kind of talisman against the evil eye is removed and he is no longer permitted free access to the women's quarters. As he grows older, he will be instructed in goat-herding, and later taught to follow the sheep. In his late teens he will have to undertake the more arduous and responsible task of herding the camels. Coincident with camel-herding, he may be given a gun by his father. Shortly afterwards he must undertake the stringent test of manhood, a journey to a distant oasis for dates. These changes are not marked off by a *rite de passage*. The rites a man undergoes during the course of a lifetime are minimal, and in the sense that they are concerned with only the basic events in a man's life anywhere (save for circumcision, which is a minor celebration anyway), they are irreducible. Moreover, the rituals which exist do not comprehend the same multiplicity of relationships as rituals which occur in many other African societies.[4] It is true that the ceremonies referred to in this chapter by no means include all the Bedouin rituals. It is also true that the events mentioned vary in elaboration, and in the number of symbols present in them, but they are not multiplied or reduced for different people.

In this context it is important to stress that we are here dealing with a lineage society where social differentiation is not built up into differences of rank, where the roles to which a man succeeds are almost wholly captured by his kinship relationships with other men and which are sociologically to be distinguished from the roles a man enters into by acquisition of office,

[4] See, for example, the elaboration of rituals discussed in M. Gluckman (Ed.), *Essays on the Ritual of Social Relations*. Manchester: University of Manchester Press, 1962.

6: Peters E-5 (1948-1950) 1965 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
Cyrenaica

membership of associations and so on. The statuses a Bedouin achieves depend not on an ordered acquisition through the inheritance of roles or election to them, but on his personal manipulation of linkages in his jockeying with others. Rites are minimal because there are few defined statuses an individual can predictably acquire. The equalitarianism of the desert denudes the Bedouin of ritual riches. Complimentarily, rites which do occur are thrown into exaggerated relief by the absence of others, and in their isolation, become not merely a "passage" but a cataclysmic change. Marriage and burial both comprehend limited fields of relations, but accompanying ceremonies may bring several hundred people together, people who otherwise rarely gather in these numbers to meet one another as kinsmen and neighbours, and it is suggested that the emphasis given to the events dramatises the significance of the changes they produce. In the discussion of the changes brought about by marriage, the Bedouin view of what is entailed will be considered first.

The Bedouin View of Marriage

After marriage, the Bedouin argue, a son has a tent of his own, a woman over whom he has authority and soon children to make him a father. Marriage causes split, branching. A new family is created, holding the potential of a new lineage. The separation is so painful a matter for the father that he cannot contemplate it, hence his pretence that he has no knowledge of wedding festivities, and his subsequent attitude that nothing has happened.

Interestingly, there are two other occasions when this attitude is to be observed. When a man kills within his corporate group,[5] he may flee his tribe or he may be compelled to leave; later he is likely to return and, when he does, he is received with a minimum of show. Every attempt is made to suppress knowledge of the event.

Again, if incest occurs, the memory of it must somehow be suppressed, and it is an ever-present danger. Men, permitted four wives simultaneously and also able to engage in a plurality of marriages through divorce or death of spouses, may have children showing an age difference of two or three generations. Thus it comes about that a man may be of an age in relation to his father's sister which permits them as children to behave as if they were first paternal cousins. As an adult, the preferred spouse for a man is a father's brother's daughter. In terms of relationships between adolescents the situation in which a man is of the same age generation as his father's sister is fraught with danger. In one such case, between a man and his father's sister, the male child of the union was put out in the desert to be

[5] Bedouin are disposed in groups which, in summer, usually constitute a single community, around or near a watering point. The men of this group are interlinked by reference to an ancestor four or five ascending generations, reckoning from the generation of men of about 20 years. When, elsewhere in this chapter reference is made to corporations, it will be to groups of this kind.